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COMMENT
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY: AN INCIPIEN-
TREND IN THE LAW OF LANDLORD-TENANT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the thirteenth century, the landlord-tenant relationship was solely
contractual, the lessee having no right in the land itself by virtue of the lease.'
During the three hundred years from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century,
however, the doctrine gradually evolved that the lease is primarily a conveyance
of an interest in the land rather than a contract.2 The strict meaning of the
term "lease" refers to its character as a conveyance,3 but "lease" is frequently
used to indicate both the conveyance and the collateral obligations assumed in
connection with it.4
As a conveyance, the lease has been governed by precepts and doctrines of
property rather than contract law.5 Basic to this property oriented approach is
the view that rent is the quid pro quo for the right to possession. If the landlord
delivers the right to possession, and thereafter does not interfere with the
tenant's possession, use and enjoyment of the premises, 7 his part of the agree-
ment is executed. Even if the tenant subsequently discovers that the premises
are completely unsuitable for his intended use, he is not relieved of the duty to
1. 2 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property § 221[1], at 177 (1967) (hereinafter cited by
volume as R. Powell].
2. Id. at 178; 1 H. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 73 (3d ed. 1939) [hereinafter
cited by volume as H. Tiffany]. This evolution is traced in terms of both legal doctrine and
social causes in 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 213-17 (3d ed. rewritten 1927).
3. Blackstone, Commentaries * 317. The lease has been judicially recognized as a con-
veyance in numerous American decisions, e.g., Carlton v. Williams, 77 Cal. 89, 19 P. 185
(1888); Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 7 A.2d 215 (1939); Averill v. Taylor, 8
N.Y. 44 (1853); see 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant §§ 1-2 (1970).
4. Davidson v. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 138 Minn. 411, 197 N.W. 833 (1924); "A
lease is both an executory contract and a present conveyance, and creates a privity of con-
tract and a privity of estate between the lessor and the lessee." Id. at 415, 197 N.W. at 834;
see 1 H. Tiffany § 74.
5. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); 3 G. Thompson, Com-
mentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property § 1029, at 87 (1959) [hereinafter cited by
volume as G. Thompson]; 6 S. Williston, Contracts § 890, at 587 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1962)
[hereinafter cited by volume as S. Williston].
6. Ostrow v. Smulkin, 249 A.2d 520 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969); Cottrell v. Gerson, 371 IlL.
174, 20 N.E.2d 74 (1939); 1 American Law of Property § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See
also Connors v. Wick, 317 Mass. 628, 59 N.E.2d 277 (1945); 52 C.JS. Landlord and Tenant
§ 466, at 352 (1968).
7. Such interference would constitute a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Di-
amond Cattle Co. v. Clark, 52 Wyo. 265, 295-96, 74 P.2d 857, 866 (1937) ; 3 G. Thompson
§ 1130.
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pay rent8 since he still retains everything he is entitled to under the convey-
ance: the right to possession.9
This rationale provides the theoretical basis for the doctrine of caveat emptor.
The doctrine as applied to leases means that the prospective lessee must protect
himself with regard to the condition of the premises by inspecting them prior to
executing the lease.10 The same rationale supports the equally well established
rule that the landlord has no duty to maintain the premises in repair during the
term of the lease. 1
Under the theory of independence of covenants, 12 if the lessor expressly cove-
nants regarding the condition of the premises or the making of repairs, absent
some statutory provisions,' 3 the lessee's sole remedy for breach is damages.",
This theory treats the covenants of each party as unilateral obligations,'5 where
the duty to perform does not depend upon performance by the other party of
any of his covenants.' 6 Thus, while the tenant may recover damages for breach
of the landlord's covenant to repair, he must continue to pay rent.
The doctrine of caveat emptor evolved in a rural, agrarian society where the
8. Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Carney v. Bercault,
348 Mass. 502, 509, 204 N.E.2d 448, 453 (1965); 3 G. Thompson § 1112, at 387-88. How-
ever, fraud or material misrepresentation on the part of the lessor would permit the lessee
to terminate the agreement. Eskin v. Freedman, 53 Ill. App. 2d 144, 203 N.E.2d 24 (1964);
Cole v. Lord, 160 Me. 223, 202 A.2d 560 (1964); Daly v. Wise, 132 N.Y. 306, 30 N.E. 837
(1892) ; Perkins v. Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934) ; see text accompanying note
83 infra.
9. See Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past
With Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 225, 235 n.18 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Quinn & Phillips].
10. Nussbaum v. Sovereign Hotel Corp., 72 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1954); Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 594-95, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961); 3 G. Thompson § 1129, at 468. "This
maxim [caveat emptor) summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine, judge, and test
for himself." Black's Law Dictionary 281 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 298, 309 (1863); Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 82 (1851); Humphrey v. Baker,
71 Okla. 272, 273, 176 P. 896, 897 (1918).
11. Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 17, 134 N.E. 703 (1922); 2 R. Powell § 233 and
cases cited therein.
12. See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 145, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970); 6 S. Willlston
§ 890, at 589; Restatement of Contracts § 290 (1932).
13. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1942 (West Supp. 1971); Okla. Stat. tit. 41, § 32 (1954).
14. Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L. 648, 92 A. 392 (1914); Duncan Dev. Co. v. Duncan
Hardware, Inc., 34 N.J. Super. 293, 298, 112 A.2d 274, 277 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 19 N.J.
328, 116 A.2d 829 (1955).
15. See 11 S. Williston § 1327.
16. In re Edgewood Park Junior College, Inc., 123 Conn. 74, 192 A. 561 (1937) ; Banister
Co. v. P.J.W. Moodie Lumber Corp., 286 Mass. 424, 190 N.E. 727 (1934); see Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 145, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970). Quinn & Phillips 233-34 characterizes the
landlord-tenant relationship as existing on two levels. The first consists of the mutually de-
pendent promises to pay rent and to turn over the right to possession. The second consists
of the landlord's other promises, e.g., to supply heat, light and other services. While a breach
in one level triggers remedies on that level, it has no effect on the other.
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subject of a lease was the land itself, and possession alone was the primary ob-
ject of the bargain.1 7 In contrast, the doctrine is applied today18 to leases which
are the result of an agreement under which the landlord agrees to provide a
liveable dwelling, supplied with such necessaries as heat and water."9 A realistic
analysis of this agreement can only lead to the conclusion that the tenant's
promise to pay rent is made in consideration of the aggregate of the landlord's
promises to supply necessary services as well as to deliver the bare right to pos-
session.20 This is clearly evident where possession alone is without value unless
the necessary services are supplied.2' In the absence of express covenants re-
garding habitability, the landlord should, in leasing a dwelling, be charged with
an implied warranty that the premises are indeed habitable.2 2 Until recently,
however, strict application of traditional property law principles has prevented
courts from adopting the implied warranty of habitability in leases.a2
The development of the doctrine of constructive eviction 2 4 has served to
mitigate the often harsh results which strict application of caveat emptor would
dictate.as Constructive eviction has been defined as "'some act of a permanent
character, done by the landlord with the intention and effect of depriving the
tenant of the enjoyment of the demised premises .. , -26 The requisite intent
"'may be inferred from the character of ... [the landlord's] acts if their
natural and probable consequence is such as to deprive the tenant of the use
17. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 427, 462 P.2d 470, 472-73 (1969); Quinn
& Phillips 227. See also Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 141, 265 A.2d 526, 532 (1970); 3 G.
Thompson § 1110.
18. Fetters v. City of Des Moines, 260 Iowa 490, 149 N.W.2d 815 (1967) ; Coleman v.
Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 253 A.2d 167 (1969). See also Smith v. M.P.W. Realty Co., 423 Pa.
536, 225 A.2d 227 (1967).
19. Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); see Real Estate Board of New York, Inc., Standard Form of Apartment Lease,
cl. 13.
20. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970).
21. See Quinn & Phillips 254. See also Barash v. Pennsylvania Term. Real Estate Corp.,
26 N.Y.2d 77, 256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970).
22. Quinn & Phillips 254 & n.74.
23. See Bruno, New Jersey Landlord-Tenant Law: Proposals for Reform, 1 Rutgers-
Camden L.J. 299, 301, 303 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bruno].
24. Id. at 335.
25. E.g., Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959)
(landlord's failure to supply light, heat, electricity and elevator service to fifth floor tenant) ;
Low v. Clifton Dey Props. Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 817, 310 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Civ. Ct. 1970) (no
refrigerator, rotted kitchen floor, holes in walls, infestation by roaches); see cases cited at
notes 29-32 infra.
26. Westland Housing Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375, 381, 44 N.E.2d 959, 962-63 (1942),
quoting Bartlett v. Farrington, 120 Mass. 284 (1876) ; see Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of
Constructive Eviction in the United States, 1 De Paul L. Rev. 69, 75-84 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as Rapacz] for a discussion of the type of act and requisite intent.
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and enjoyment of the premises let.' "27 Where the landlord's wrongful acts have
rendered the premises untenantable, the tenant may vacate the premises and
terminate his obligation to pay rent.28 A constructive eviction has been held to
have occurred as a result of, e.g., the landlord's failure to curb vermin infesta-
tion,-9 to supply heat,80 to stop dampness and leakage,8 ' and to eliminate foul,
offensive odors.3 2
In practice, however, this doctrine is not an adequate solution for the ag-
grieved tenant, since he must assume the risk of being held liable for rent if it
is later determined that the defects in the premises were not sufficient to con-
stitute a constructive eviction 33 An even more serious objection to the adequacy
of this remedy lies in the realities of modern urban living: a tenant may be un-
able to abandon the premises because a critical housing shortage prevents his
finding another place to live.3 4 Without abandonment, most courts have refused
to find a constructive eviction.3 5 Moreover, the low income tenant is faced with
an additional problem: even if he could find a new home, he simply may not be
able to afford the move.36
27. Westland Housing Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375, 381, 44 N.E.2d 959, 963 (1942),
quoting Tracy v. Long, 295 Mass. 201, 205, 3 N.E.2d 789, 791 (1936); see 3 G. Thompson
§ 1132; 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 445 (1968).
28. Yaffee v. American Fixture, Inc., 345 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. 1961); Leider v. 80 William
Street Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 952, 255 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1st Dep't 1964). See generally I Ameri-
can Law of Property §§ 3.49-.51 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
29. Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct. 1967);
Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
30. Ira Handleman Bldg. Corp. v. Dolan, 15 IM. App. 2d 49, 145 N.E.2d 250 (1957);
Bass v. Rollins, 63 Minn. 226, 65 N.W. 348 (1895).
31. Rea v. Algren, 104 Minn. 316, 116 N.W. 580 (1908); Siegel v. National Bead & Stone
Co., 37 Misc. 2d 897, 237 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Civ. Ct. 1963).
32. Heissenbuttel v. Coronas, 14 Misc. 2d 509, 177 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Westchester County Ct.
1958).
33. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 431, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969). Since it Is the evic-
tion which terminates the tenant's duty to pay rent (Rapacz 87) a court's determination that
there was no eviction means that the landlord is entitled to the rent under the terms of the
lease. See e.g., Katz v. Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158 N.E. 264 (1927) ; Trustees of Sailors' Snug
Harbor v. Sugarman, 264 App. Div. 240, 35 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1st Dep't 1942).
34. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970). But see Thompson v.
Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687, 173 S.E.2d 627 (1970), which held that a critical housing
shortage is beyond the scope of judicial notice.
35. Radinsky v. Weaver, 460 P.2d 218, 220 (Colo. 1969); City of New York v. Deland,
63 Misc. 2d 494, 495, 311 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676-77 (Civ. Ct. 1970); Thompson v. Shoemaker,
7 N.C. App. 687, 173 S.E.2d 627 (1970). The doctrine of constructive eviction without aban-
donment has not been widely accepted by the courts (Quinn & Phillips 238) although Massa-
chusetts seems to allow it. See Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Maws. 124, 163
N.E.2d 4 (1959).
36. See 1968 Wash. U.L.Q. 461, 473. But see Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687,
173 S.E.2d 627 (1970), where the court rejected the tenant's allegation that she could not
afford to move on the grounds that she had continued to pay rent.
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11. HousING LEGISLATION
The realization that the development of large urban centers had created social
conditions requiring legislative control led to the widespread enactment of hous-
ing codes at the turn of the century 3 7 These codes were intended to require the
landlord to maintain the leased premises at a minimum level of repair. They were
not effective, however, and they have continued to be ineffective to the present
time, in compelling landlords to improve substandard housing. 38
One shortcoming of state housing legislation is that, in most instances, it does
not apply to all local governmental units within the state. The New York Multi-
ple Dwelling Law,3 9 for example, applies only to cities with a population of 500,000
or more.40 Prior to 1954, this meant that many areas simply had no housing
legislation, since only 56 municipal housing codes had been enacted in the entire
country.41 The Federal Housing Act of 1954,4 however, required local com-
munities to develop workable programs to eliminate slums and urban blight in
order to qualify for urban renewal assistance, public housing aid and FHA..
mortgage insurance. As a result more than 1,000 communities have enacted
housing codes.43 Unfortunately, these codes have not been effectively enforced.44
While there are many factors contributing to lack of enforcement, such as
inadequate administrative resources45 and lack of motivation on the part of
37. E.g., New York Tenement House Act of 1901, Law of April 12, 1901, ch. 334, (1901]
N.Y. Laws 124th Sess. 889; Law of June 7, 1895, No. 110, [1895] Pa. Laws 178; see
Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 Colum. L. Rev.
1254, 1259-62 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Gribetz & Grad]; 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 152, 156.
Previous legislation had been designed to protect the public from fire and building collapse,
rather than to protect the tenant Gribetz & Grad 1259. For a history of building and housing
regulations in New York City from the 17th Century through 1944, see J. McGoldrick, S.
Graubard & R. Horowitz, Building Regulation in New York City (1944).
38. Gribetz & Grad 1255; Quinn & Phillips 249; Note, Enforcement of Municipal Hous-
ing Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801 (1965); see Note, Rent Withholding for Minnesota: A Pro-
posal, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 82 (1970).
39. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law §§ 1-367 (McKinney 1946), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1970).
40. Id. § 3 (McKinney Supp. 1970). Another e.ample is Minn. Stat. §§ 460.01-.86 (1963),
which applies only to first class cities without a home rule charter. There are no such cities
in the state. Note, Rent Withholding for Minnesota: A Proposal, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 82, 91
n.60 (1970).
41. Gribetz & Grad 1260 n.19.
42. Act of Aug. 2, 1954, ch. 649, § 101, 68 Stat. 590, codified as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1451(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
43. Gribetz & Grad 1260 n.19; Moskovitz & Honigsberg, The Tenant Union-Landlord
Relations Act: A Proposal, 58 Geo. L.J. 1013, 1014 (1970) [hereinafter died as Moskovitz
& Honigsberg].
44. Moskovitz & Honigsberg 1014; Quinn & Phillips 239-40; authorities cited note 38
supra. The inadequate enforcement of housing codes was noted as early as 1927. See Ford, The
Enforcement of Housing Legislation, 42 Pol. Sci. Q. 549, 551-60 (1927).
45. Bruno 303-04 & n.25; Quinn & Phillips 241; Comment, Rent Withholding and the
Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 304 (1965).
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politically sensitive officials,4 6 it has been suggested that the failure of code en-
forcement is primarily attributable to the reliance on criminal penalties to
enforce compliance.47 In the early 1900's the primary sanction was the order to
vacate which, by requiring tenants to vacate substandard buildings, deprived
the landlord of his rent.48 The prolonged -housing shortage, however, has caused
its virtual abandonment.49 Consequently, the alternative criminal penalties have
become the primary means of enforcement r° Unfortunately, the courts have gen-
erally exacted only minimal fines, 51 and have rarely sentenced a convicted land-
lord to jail.52 If the landlord bases his decision to repair on business considera-
tions, he will usually find it much more economical to simply pay the fine rO
and since he runs little risk of going to jail, there is no effective pressure to
coerce his compliance with the applicable code.
More recent legislation has emphasized rent impairing remedies.54 These
statutes fall into one of three categories: repair and deduct, 6 rent withholding
or abatement, 56 and receivership. 57 While this type of legislation is potentially
more effective, being directed toward the landlord's pecuniary interest, those
statutes which have thus far been enacted have failed to effectively fulfill their
promise.
Repair and deduct statutes have been enacted in six states. 8 Permitting a
tenant to repair serious deficiencies after the landlord has failed or refused to
do so and then to deduct the cost of such repairs from his rent could be an
efficient and effective remedy, yet this procedure has been all but emasculated
by other statutory provisions. Two states, for instance, limit the total cost of
46. Gribetz & Grad 1256-57.
47. Id. at 1256. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 304(1) (McKinney Supp. 1970), e.g., provides
that punishment for violations shall be "by a fine ... by imprisonment ... or by both...
for a first violation.
48. 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 152, 156 (1970) ; see Gribetz & Grad 1275. Ordering the tenant
to vacate premises maintained in violation of housing regulations deprives the landlord of his
right to rent, but is hardly an ideal remedy from the tenant's point of view. Id.
49. See 1966 N.Y.C. Dep't of Bldgs. Ann. Rep. 242-43; 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 152, 156
(1970).
50. Quinn & Phillips 239; 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 152, 156 (1970).
51. See 1966 N.Y.C. Dep't of Bldgs. Ann. Rep. 244. In 1966 the average fine per case
was $14.58. Id. See also Quinn & Phillips 240.
52. See P. Wald, Law and Poverty: 1965, at 15 (1965); Moskovitz & Honigsberg 1046;
Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 824 (1965).
53. Gribetz & Grad 1277; Quinn & Phillips 240-41.
54. Moskovitz & Honigsberg 1048-52; Quinn & Phillips 242-49.
55. See note 58 infra.
56. See notes 61-65 infra.
57. See note 73 infra.
58. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1941-42 (West 1954); La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2692-94 (West
1952); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 42-201 to -202 (1961); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 47-16-12 to
-13 (1954); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, §§ 31-32 (1954); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 43-32-8
to -9 (1967).
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repairs chargeable to the landlord to one month's rent,r9 hardly adequate to
rehabilitate an uninhabitable dwelling. Furthermore, all of the states permit the
landlord to nullify the operation of the statute by a provision in the lease.00
Rent abatement or withholding statutes vary greatly in their respective pro-
cedural requisites. Under some, the withholding action may be initiated by a
public agency such as a welfare department,61 or a designated public official.G
Under others, it can be initiated by the tenants themselves.0 Generally, they
provide for suspension or reduction65 of rent if the premises do not meet
statutory standards. But some statutes allow the landlord to collect the amount
withheld after he has initiated6 or completed0 7 repairs, and thus do not effec-
tively deter the landlord from allowing his buildings to deteriorate initially.
Even if there is no such provision, the landlord will often find it less costly to
accept reduced rent than to make the necessary repairs.68 In such a case, the
remedy amounts to little more than damages for living in squalor.
The foregoing objections are based on the inadequacies of the statute once
invoked, but a basic problem with this remedy is that many tenants, especially
those in the urban ghetto, have found themselves evicted by their landlord in
retaliation for invoking the law.69 While a few statutes prohibit the practice,"
and at least one court has refused to enforce it,71 retaliatory eviction continues
to deter tenants from invoking rent withholding statutes in most jurisdictions.T-
The third category, receivership, is a variation of the rent withholding statute
which provides additional procedural machinery for having a receiver appointed
59. Cal. Civ. Code § 1942 (West 1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 42-202 (1961).
60. E.g. Cal. Civ. Code § 1941 (West 1954) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 42-201 (1961) ; NJ.
Cent. Code § 47-16-12 (1960) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, § 31 (1954) ; S.D. Compiled Laws Ann.
§ 43-32-8 (1967). In Louisiana this result has been permitted by the courts. See Pecararo
v. Grover, 5 La. App. 676 (1927). The California Civil Code has been amended by § 1942.1
(West Supp. 1970), which declares such a waiver void where the premises are uninhabitable.
61. E.g., N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 143-b (McKinney 1966).
62. E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-77(a) (Supp. 1970).
63. E.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 239, § 8A (1970); Pa. Stat. Ann. it. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp.
1971).
64. E.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1971); R.1. Gen. Laws Ann. § 45-24.2-11
(Supp. 1968).
65. E.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-77 (Supp. 1970).
66. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.530-.531 (Supp. 1971).
67. E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 441.570 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 755
(McKinney Supp. 1970).
68. See, e.g., People v. Rowen, 9 N.Y.2d 732, 174 N.E.2d 331, 214 N.Y.S2d 347 (1961),
where correction of the violations would have cost $42,500.
69. See Bruno 304-05 & n.31; Quinn & Phillips 243.
70. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1970); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 80, § 71 (1966);
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:170-92.1 (Supp. 1970).
71. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
While the District of Columbia does not have such a statute, the court refused to enforce
a retaliatory eviction on public policy grounds.
72. See Quinn & Phillips 243 & n.46.
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to operate the building and make the necessary repairs.73 Expenditures are
recouped out of the rent, which is deposited in court.74 While this type of remedy
has been fairly successful 75 when it has been utilized, procedural complexities
make it difficult to invoke.76 Furthermore, the receiver is generally a municipal
officer,77 thus widespread use of this remedy will inevitably involve the mu-
nicipality in directly administering and managing an enormous number of pri-
vately owned buildings.78
The various shortcomings of each type of housing legislation have in many
instances prevented the utilization of potentially effective remedies by aggrieved
tenants. An additional problem, however, lies in the fact that relatively few
jurisdictions have adopted rent impairing legislation at all. 79 Absent the adop-
tion of more effective housing legislation on a much wider scale, or, alternatively,
of legislation which abrogates property law concepts with respect to these leases
and declares them to be contracts, the protection of a tenant's right to a liveable
dwelling in return for his rent can only be insured by the development of the
common law of landlord-tenant.
III. ANALYSiS OF RECENT DEcIsIoNs
Recent decisions ° in several jurisdictions have recognized the existence of
an implied warranty of habitability in the lease of a dwelling. These decisions
included both cases where the tenant brought an action against the landlord,81
and cases where the tenant asserted his rights defensively in resisting the land-
73. E.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111, § 127H(d) (1967); N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law
§ 309(5) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
74. See N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 309(5) (McKinney Supp. 1970). Massachusetts does
not have such a provision. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111, § 127H(d) (1967).
75. From the time of its enactment in 1962 to early in 1966, the New York statute re-
sulted in 120 buildings being placed in receivership. Gribetz & Grad 1273. It has been main-
tained that the statute has effectively coerced landlords to make substantial Improvements on
their own. Gribetz, New York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. Housing 215, 297 (1964).
76. Quinn & Phillips 249; see N. LeBlanc, A Handbook of Landlord-Tenant Procedures
and Law, With Forms 30-31 (2d ed. 1969).
77. E.g., N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 309(5) (c) (1) (McKinney Supp. 1970) (Com-
missioner of Real Estate); see Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.535(2) (Supp. 1971).
78. See Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53
Calif. L. Rev. 304, 335-36 (1965), where it is maintained that this is the necessary result of
an effective urban rehabilitation program.
79. Eighteen states have adopted this type of legislation.
80. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970) ; Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Lund v. MacArthur,
51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ. Ct. 1970), did not
find an implied warranty of habitability, but utilized another principle to reach the same
result as Marini v. Ireland, supra. See text accompanying notes 130-38 infra. Amanuensis,
Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971) and Jackson v. Rivera,
318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. 1971) permitted tenants to defend summary proceedings for non-
payment of rent on the basis of the landlord's failure to comply with statutory standards.
81. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Garcia v. Freeland Realty,
Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
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lord's action for rent,82 but the holdings were broadly stated, and none at-
tempted to restrict their effect to the particular facts in issue. Prior to these
decisions, in the absence of fraud or material misrepresentation,83 there were
only two exceptions to the rule of caveat emptor. One permitted a warranty of
habitability to be implied in a short term lease of a furnished dwelling.84 The
other applied to leases involving a building to be constructed for a particular
purpose.8 5 These recent decisions, then, represent a drastic modification of prior
law. Their primary effect is to greatly expand the number of non-statutory
remedies available to the tenant. The remedies in these cases included per-
mitting the tenant to make the necessary repairs and recover the expenses from
the landlord,80 abating or suspending rent during the period of uninhabit-
ability, 7 and terminating the lease.88 Potentially, however, the entire range of
contract remedies89 should become available,9 since the cases have also treated
the entire rental agreement as a contract and abandoned the theory of in-
dependence of covenants.9l
Underlying these decisions is the realization that public policy must impose
upon the landlord the obligation to insure the habitability of premises leased
for dwelling purposes,92 yet the rationale of each case differs markedly. The
82. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Marini v. Ire-
land, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
83. See note 8 supra and cases cited therein.
84. This exception was originally enunciated in the English case of Smith v. Marrable, 152
Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843), and has generally been followed in the United States. See, eg.,
Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922); Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39
N.E.2d 644 (1942); 1 American Law of Property § 3.45 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
85. Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938); J.D.
Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Civ. App. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 66
S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933); Hardman v. McNair, 61 Wash. 74, 111 P. 1059
(1910).
86. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) ; Jackson v. Rivera, 318 N.Y.S.2d
7 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ.
Ct. 1970).
87. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.YS.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
88. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426,462 P.2d 470 (1969).
89. See text accompanying notes 167-87 infra.
90. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1082; Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii at
434-36, 462 P.2d at 475. Accord, Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363
(Civ. Ct. 1971).
91. While a number of cases have introduced contract principles, including mutual
dependence of covenants, none have found mutuality between the two levels of the landlord-
tenant relationship posited by Quinn and Phillips. Note 16 supra. See Note, Contract Principles
and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.. Rev. 24 (1970). See also Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v.
Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,
53 NJ. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); 6 S. Williston § 890A, at 632.
92. Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1074-80; Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
at 433, 462 P.2d at 474; Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. at 141-43, 265 A.2d at 532-33; Garcia v.
Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d at 939, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 219. Legal scholarship has also
addressed itself to this issue. See note 170 infra and authorities cited therein.
1971]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
various approaches taken by the courts are important because the cases evidence
a growing trend toward establishing the implied warranty of habitability in the
leasing of dwellings as an accepted rule of law in American jurisdictions 3
A. Lemle & Marini
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Lemle v. Breeden,04 held that there is an
implied warranty of habitability in the lease of a dwelling for residential pur-
posesY5 While the Lemle holding was not expressly restricted to furnished dwell-
ings, the case involved a furnished house, and thus technically fell within the
furnished dwelling exception."6 Consequently, in Lund v. MacArthur,97 the
court expressly extended the principle to unfurnished dwellings as well.98
The Lemle decision was an overt promulgation of public policy, necessitated
and justified by the changed needs of modern society 9 In its decision the court
reviewed the history of the rule of caveat emptor as applied to leases,10 0 and
concluded that the doctrine should be reexamined.' 0 ' The court noted a parallel
with the implied warranty of fitness and merchantability in the law of sales,
and summarized the policy reasons for implied warranties in that field: "The
reasoning has been (1) that the public interest in safety and consumer protec-
tion requires it, and (2) that the burden ought to be shifted to the manufacturer
who, by placing the goods on the market, represents their suitability and fit-
ness." 102 Citing a number of cases where this reasoning was applied to sales of
new homes, 1 3 the court concluded that the reasoning is equally persuasive in
leases of real property.'04 Having decided that there is an implied warranty of
habitability in the lease of a dwelling house, the court proceeded to characterize
the lease as primarily a contractual relationship 0 5 wherein mutuality of cove-
93. See Schweiger v. Superior Ct. of Alameda County, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1970), where it was said in dicta that public policy requires leased premises to be
maintained in habitable condition.
94. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969), noted in 38 Fordham L. Rev. 818 (1970). The
plaintiff, after a brief inspection, leased defendant's furnished house for two short term
periods. Rat infestation required abandonment three days after he went into possession.
Thereafter, plaintiff brought an action to recover his deposit and rent payment.
95. Id. at 433, 462 P.2d at 474.
96. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
97. 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969). This was an action by the landlord for rent.
The defendant had abandoned the premises after learning of serious violations of the local
building code.
98. Id. at 475, 462 P.2d at 483.
99. Id. at 429-34, 462 P.2d at 472-74.
100. Id. at 429-33, 462 P.2d at 472-73; see text accompanying notes 10-32 supra.
101. 51 Hawaii at 432, 462 P.2d at 473. For an earlier critical analysis of this doctrine,
see Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), where the Wisconsin Supreme
Court adopted the furnished dwelling exception. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
102. 51 Hawaii at 432, 462 P.2d at 473, citing W. Prosser, Torts § 97 (3d ed. 1964).
103. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Sup. Ct.
1968), aff'd mem., 448 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
104. 51 Hawaii at 432, 462 P.2d at 474.
105. Id. at 432, 462 P.2d at 474. The court cited no authority for this conclusion. It
is, therefore, probably a policy decision based upon the changed needs of society.
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nants would apply. This aspect of the decision is extremely important, since the
availability of contract remedies provides the means by which the policy de-
termination is implemented.' 0 6
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Marini v. Ireland,0 7 discussed the ba-
sic elements-society's changed needs and the lease as a contract-but the
emphasis was reversed. After discussing the doctrine of caveat emptor,08 the
court ignored traditional landlord-tenant concepts and utilized guidelines ap-
plicable to the construction of contracts in order to reach its holding./°° Start-
ing with the premise that a covenant can arise either from the specific language
of the lease, or by implication where it is indispensable to the purpose of the
lease, the court stated that the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the
circumstances of the letting, is determinative of what covenants may be im-
plied.110 Since the lease itself restricted the use of the premises to "dwelling,"
the very object of the letting was found to be providing the lessee with suitable
living quarters, and the landlord was therefore held to have impliedly warranted
that this was what he had available."'
Implying the warranty, however, would have been a futile gesture under the
traditional independence of covenants doctrine, so the court followed the con-
tract construction principle through to its logical conclusion and held the land-
lord's implied covenant of habitability and the tenant's covenant to pay rent
to be mutually dependent." 2
B. Javins
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,"13 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columlia Circuit held that a warranty of habitability is im-
106. See text accompanying notes 167-87 infra.
107. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). After repeatedly attempting to inform the
plaintiff-landlord that the toilet in the demised premises was cracked and leaking water onto
the floor, defendant hired a plumber to make the necessary repairs. Defendant then deducted
the cost of these repairs from the following month's rent. Plaintiff brought an action for
summary dispossess and recovery of the rent balance. The trial court found for the land-
lord, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded for a new trial in con-
formity with its holding.
108. Id. at 141-43, 265 A.2d at 532-33. The New Jersey Supreme Court had previously
criticized this doctrine in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
109. 56 N.J. at 141-44, 265 A.2d at 533-34, citing 3 G. Thompson § 377; see 4 S. Wil'liston
§§ 602-03.
110. 56 N.J. at 143, 265 A.2d at 533, citing, inter alia, Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.,
33 N.J. 36, 161 A.2d 717 (1960); Washington Constr. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 84 A2d
617 (1951). See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Sloan, 68 F.2d 222, 228 (4th Cir. 1934) ; Arizona Land
Title & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 6 Ariz. App. 52, 57, 429 P.2d 686, 691 (1967) ; Maw
v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 440, 443, 354 P.2d 121, 123 (1960); 4 S. Williston § 618, at 716-17.
111. 56 N.J. at 144, 265 A.2d at 533-34, citing Hyland v. Parkside Inv. Co., 10 N.J. Misc.
1148, 162 A. 251 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
112. 56 NJ. at 145-46, 265 A2d at 534-35. Contra, cases cited at note 16 supra.
113. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), noted in 39 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 152 (1970) and 84 Harv. L. Rev. 729 (1971). The landlord, First National Realty
Corp., brought actions against Javins and two other tenants seeking to recover possession
of its apartments for the tenants' failure to pay rent. By way of a defense, the tenants
alleged approximately 1,500 violations of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations.
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plied in leases by the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia, 14 and
also concluded that "the common law itself must recognize the landlord's
obligation to keep his premises in a habitable condition." 115 While this con-
clusion was expressed in dictum, it was supported by a well-reasoned analysis
which lends authoritative support to the development of the doctrine of im-
plied warranty of habitability in leases.
The court's conclusion was based on three separate considerations. The first
was that the old rule is based on factual assumptions which were appropriate
to the agrarian economy of the Middle Ages, but which are no longer valid
today." 6 The court stated that the assumptions that "the land was more
important than whatever small living structure was included in the leasehold"117
and that "the tenant farmer was fully capable of making repairs himself"" 8
are no longer true with regard to the modern urban tenant, and that, there-
fore, the old rule can no longer be justified in these terms.
Next, the court stated that landlord-tenant law should be brought into
harmony with the principles supporting consumer protection cases based on
implied warranties of quality." 9 This aspect of the opinion presented the same
arguments as were used by the court in Lemle, 20 and which were discussed
above.' 2 '
The third and final consideration was to be found in the present urban hous-
ing situation. The court noted the inequality in bargaining power between
landlord and tenant,'22 certain impediments to competition in the rental housing
market, tm and the severe shortage of adequate housing124 as compelling reasons
for adopting the new approach.
The nexus of the holding, however, was the Housing Regulations.'2 5 While
114. D.C. Housing Regs. (1967). The argument that these regulations could be the basis
of an implied warranty of habitability was made in Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent
Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 Geo. L.J. 519, 524 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Schoshinskil.
115. 428 F.2d at 1077.
116. Id.; see Quinn & Phillips 231.
117. 428 F.2d at 1077 (footnote omitted).
118. Id. (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at 1075. This part of the decision is very well documented. See id. at 1075-76 &
nn.14-25.
120. 428 F.2d at 1075-76. The court cites Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470
(1969), in support of its conclusion. Id. at 1076.
121. See text accompanying notes 94-106 supra.
122. 428 F.2d at 1079. The court cited Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (1968);
2 R. Powell, supra note 1, § 221[1], at 183; President's Committee on Urban Housing, A
Decent Home 96 (1968) & nn.44-46 [hereinafter cited as A Decent Home].
123. 428 F.2d at 1079. The impediments noted were class and racial discrimination, and
standard form leases.
124. Id. at 1079, citing A Decent Home.
125. Id. at 1081. The court specifically relied on D.C. Housing Regs. § 2501 (1967)
which stated: "Every premises accommodating one or more habitations shall be maintained
and kept in repair so as to provide decent living accommodations for the occupants. This
part of this Code contemplates more than mere basic repairs and maintenance to keep out
the elements; its purpose is to include repairs and maintenance designed to make a premises
or neighborhood healthy and safe." The Housing Regulations have since been amended to
expressly provide for an implied warranty that the landlord will comply with the regula-
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the Regulations do not specifically provide for private remedies, the court cited
two decisions which had held that they do create rights enforceable by the tenant
in tort. 2 6 Noting that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Brown v.
Southall Realty Co.,127 had viewed the lease as a contract and held it illegal
and void because the condition of the premises before the lease term began
seriously violated the Housing Regulations,rm8 the court said: "We think it
untenable to find that this section has no effect on the contract after it has
been signed. To the contrary, by signing the lease, the landlord has undertaken
a continuing obligation to the tenant to maintain the premises in accord with all
applicable law."' 29 The court further held that these statutory obligations may
not be waived by agreement.
C. Garcia, Amanuensis & Jackson
In Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc.,20 the Civil Court of the City of New
York did not find an implied warranty of habitability, but reached the same
result as the Marini case' 31 by relying on the obligations imposed on the land-
lord by sections 78132 and 8013 of the New York Multiple Dwelling Law.
Since these sections had previously been held to be enforceable by the city
only, 34 the court stated they could not be the basis of a claim for reimburse-
ment of the cost of repair by the lessee.135 However, since the case involved
tions. D.C. Housing Regs. § 2902.2 (1971). Cf. Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 323
N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
126. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Kanelos
v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53
Cal. Rptr. 267 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Rietze v. Williams, 458 S.W2d 613 (Ky. 1970); Altz
v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922). Compare these holdings with the Massachu-
setts rule that a landlord's violation of a safety statute does not create a cause of action in
favor of the tenant, but is merely evidence of negligence. Dolan v. Suffolk Franklyn Say.
Bank, 355 Mass. 655, 246 N.E.2d 798 (1968).
127. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
128. D.C. Housing Regs. § 2501 (1956). For text of regulation, see note 125 supra.
129. 428 F.2d at 1081. In support of its position, the court cited Schiro v. W.E. Gould
& Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1048 & nn.55-56 (1937).
130. 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ. Ct. 1970). Tenant's children were eating
plaster and paint flaking off apartment walls. After complaining to landlord who took
no action, tenant replastered and painted the walls himself and brought this action to re-
cover for materials furnished and labor performed.
131. In Garcia, as in Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), the tenant
was awarded recovery of the cost of putting the premises into habitable condition himself,
after the landlord had refused or neglected to do so. 63 Misc. 2d at 943, 314 N.Y.S2d at 222.
132. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 78(1) (McKinney 1946) provides in part: "Every multiple
dwelling . . .shall be kept in good repair. The owner shall be responsible for compliance
with the provisions of this section... !'
133. Id. § 80(1) provides in part: "The owner shall keep all and every part of a multiple
dweling... dean and free from vermin, dirt, filth, garbage or other thing or matter danger-
ous to life or health."
134. 63 Misc. 2d at 938, 314 N.YS.2d at 217-18. The court cited Davar Holdings, Inc.
v. Cohen, 255 App. Div. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Ist Dep't 1938), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 828,
21 N.E.2d 882 (1939) and Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank v. One Hundred Eight West Forty
Ninth Street Corp., 255 App. Div. 570, 8 N.YS.2d 354 (Ist Dep't 1938).
135. 63 Misc. 2d at 938, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 218; see note 134 supra and cases cited therein.
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the ingestion by the tenant's children of flaking plaster and paint,130 the court
reached its decision by relying on the landlord's tort liability for injuries suffered
by the tenant or members of his family as a result of the landlord's failure to
make repairs as required by sections 78 and 80.137 Arguing that the tenant's
repairs constituted prevention of an actionable tort, the court held that it was
reasonable to reimburse him for the expenses incurred.1 8 8
The holding in Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown,130 also decided by the Civil Court
of the City of New York, went much further than Garcia, and sustained the
tenants' defense based on breach of warranty of habitability against the land-
lord's claim for rent. The court found that the appellate division cases which
had been identified as controlling in Garcia, Davar Holdings, Inc. v. Cohen1"0
and Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank v. One Hundred Eight West Forty
Ninth Street Corp.,141 did not compel a holding which sustained a landlord's
right to rent where a residential building is operated in systematic violation of
the law.' 2 The court stated that those cases "[left] . . . ample discretion to
achieve decent and fair results in accordance with present day realities .... ,,143
The court identified three factors which distinguished Davar and Emigrant
from the present case: in those cases (1) the landlord had acted in good faith;
(2) the violation did not significantly impair habitability; and (3) routine
housing code enforcement was expected to be effective.' 4 4 Holding that the
appellate division did not intend to lay down a rule of universal application in
Davar, the court construed that holding as applying only to the type of case
then before the court.
1 45
136. 63 Misc. 2d at 940, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 219. Contra, Kolojeski v. John Deisher, Inc.,
429 Pa. 191, 239 A.2d 329 (1968), where defendant landlord's use of lead base paint which
resulted in death of tenant's two year old child was held not to constitute actionable
negligence.
137. 63 Misc. 2d at 941, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 220, citing Weiner v. Leroco Realty Corp.,
279 N.Y. 127, 17 N.E.2d 796 (1938); Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922);
Benjamin v. Woodner Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 68, 253 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't 1964); Moore
v. Bryant, 27 Misc. 2d 22, 83 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1948); see cases cited note 81 supra.
138. 63 Misc. 2d at 943, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 222. The plaintiff was awarded the cost of
materials he had purchased, but his claim of $70 for labor was not granted. Instead, he was
awarded an amount based on $1.60 an hour, the minimum wage for unskilled labor. Id.,
314 N.Y.S.2d at 222-23.
139. 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971). The landlord brought a summary
proceeding against tenants who counterclaimed for damages for violation of the warranty
of quiet enjoyment and fitness for use. The landlord had acquired the building on April 4,
1969. At that time, and for several years before, there had been numerous housing code
violations recorded against the property which the landlord had done little or nothing to
correct.
140. 255 App. Div. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 828,
21 N.E.2d 882 (1939).
141. 255 App. Div. 570, 8 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1st Dep't 1938).
142. 65 Misc. 2d at 18, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 15; cf. Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc.
2d at 937-38, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 217-18.
143. 65 Misc. 2d at 18, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
144. Id. at 19-20, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
145. Id. at 20, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
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Having thus disposed of the limitations of Davar and Emigrant, the court
identified two factual assumptions which influenced those decisions, but which
it felt were no longer valid. The first was that code enforcement would be
effective,146 the second, that a tenant could readily move to a suitable dwell-
ing.147 The court then referred to modern legal scholarship 4" and recent de-
cisions in other jurisdictions1 49 in support of its conclusion that the older doc-
trine which permitted a landlord to recover rent while in violation of statutory
requirements should be limited to situations such as were before the court in
Davar.15o
The court then held that violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law1l 1 and the
housing code would permit residential tenants to raise a defense in eviction
proceedings for nonpayment of rent in three situations:
First, where the landlord has not made a good faith effort to comply with the law,
and there have been substantial violations seriously affecting the habitability of the
premises.
Second, where there are substantial violations and code enforcement remedies have
been pursued and have been ineffective.
Third, where substantial violations exist and their continuance is part of a purpose-
ful and illegal effort to force tenants to abandon their apartments.1 -
The court also stated that a violation of the warranties of quiet enjoyment
and fitness for use may result in a landlord's being liable to the tenant for
damages, but further held that the defendants had not proved damages in
excess of the rent withheld.1 53
In Jackson v. Rivera,lss the issue was the tenant's right to make emergency
repairs and set off the reasonable cost against the rent claimed. The court
characterized this as being substantially the same question as posed by Amanu-
146. As authority for the conclusion that code enforcement has been inadequate the
court cited Gribetz & Grad, supra note 37, and Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801 (1965). 65 iflsc. 2d at 19, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 17; see text accom-
panying notes 37-39 supra.
147. 65 Misc. 2d at 19-20, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 17. The court cited no authority in support
of its conclusion that this is no longer true, but discussed the fact that a severe housing
shortage has existed since World War II. Id.
148. Id. at 20, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 17, citing Quinn & Phillips and Sax & Hiestand, Slum-
lordism as a Tort, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 869 (1967); Schoshinski, supra note 114.
149. 65 Misc. 2d at 20, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 18, citing, inter alia, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 395 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
150. 65 Misc. 2d at 20, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
151. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law §§ 1-367 (McKinney 1946), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1970).
152. 65 Misc. 2d at 21, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
153. Id. at 24, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
154. 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. 1971). The landlord brought a summary proceeding for
nonpayment of rent. The tenant asserted a right to deduct the cost of having her toilet re-
paired, which she had done after the landlord refused to repair it. The court permitted her
to deduct $22.00, the actual cost, which was found to be a reasonable amount.
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ensis. Davar 55 was distinguished as it had been in Amanuensis, and the court
then briefly restated its discussion of the ineffectiveness of housing code en-
forcement, scholarly criticism of the independence of the landlord's right to
rent, and recent decisions in other jurisdictions.5 6
The court found that the landlord had violated his statutory duty to repair
under the Multiple Dwelling Law,1 7 and that the nature of the situation-a
defective toilet-created an emergency which could not await the outcome of
court proceedings. Under the circumstances, "[t] he tenant was entitled to have
her toilet put in working condition promptly."' 58 The court held that a tenant
may make repairs and deduct their reasonable cost from the rent where (1) the
situation creates an emergency affecting habitability, (2) the landlord has re-
fused to make repairs, and (3) the condition cannot reasonably continue until
code enforcement proceedings have run their course.'6 9
In contrast to Garcia,60 which provided relief for the tenant while remaining
within the bounds of traditional landlord-tenant law as set forth in Davarlo
and Emigrant, 62 Amanuensis and Jackson limited the applicability of those
cases and applied the modern concept of mutuality between the landlord's right
to rent and the tenant's right to a habitable dwelling.1 0' Until the appellate
courts reconsider the law in this area, these decisions indicate that New York
may well follow the trend established by Lemle,'6 Marins'"6 and Javins. 00
IV. REMEDIES MADE AVAILABLE
Under prior law, the tenant whose leased dwelling became uninhabitable
could either repair the defects at his own expense' 67 or abandon the premises
and invoke the doctrine of constructive eviction.'6 8 The implied warranty of
habitability would greatly expand his choice of remedies, because the courts
which recognize that doctrine have at the same time treated the lease as a con-
155. 255 App. Div. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd mene., 280 N.Y. 828,
21 N.E.2d 882 (1939).
156. 318 N.Y.S.2d at 9. The court cited the same authorities as had been cited for these
conclusions in Amanuensis. See notes 144, 146-47 supra.
157. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 78 (McKinney 1946); see note 132 supra for text of this
section.
158. 318 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
159. Id.
160. See text accompanying notes 130-38 supra.
161. 255 App. Div. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 828,
21 N.E.2d 882 (1939); see text accompanying notes 140-45 supra.
162. 255 App. Div. 570, 8 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1st Dep't 1938); see text accompanying notes
141-45 supra.
163. Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d at 19-21, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18. Jackson
v. Rivera, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 8-9.
164. See text accompanying notes 94-106 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 107-12 supra.
166. See text accompanying notes 113-29 supra; see Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine,
323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
167. See 3 G. Thompson § 1140, at 532.
168. See text accompanying notes 24-36 supra. See also Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C.
Cir. 1946); O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 III. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545




tractual relationship,169 and construed the implied warranty of habitability and
the tenant's promise to pay rent as mutually dependent."70 Thus, breach of the
landlord's warranty gives the tenant his choice among the basic contract
remedies," 1 the most helpful of which are damages -72 and rescission."'
General damages for breach of warranty in sales contracts are measured by
the difference between the value of the goods received and the value of the
goods as warranted.174 By analogy, the aggrieved tenant would be awarded the
difference between the value of the defective premises and the value of the
premises in a habitable state of repair. In landlord-tenant terminology, this
would amount to an abatement of the rent, or possibly even a suspension of it
if the premises are found to be totally without value. This was the remedy
which the Javins court adopted,"75 remanding the case for the determination of
whether substantial violations existed, and if so, what portion of the tenant's
obligation to pay rent was suspended by the landlord's breach."0 The Amanu-
ensis court also applied this remedy and set off repair costs against the tenant's
rent obligation and permitted the tenant to deposit rent in escrow until con-
ditions were remedied by the landlord. 177
Rescission is an alternative to the remedy of damages. In sales law it ter-
minates the contract and allows the aggrieved party to recover whatever he has
given or its value. 78 Applying this to the lease situation, the tenant would be
permitted to terminate the lease and recover payments made, although he
might be charged with liability for the reasonable value, if any, of his use and
occupation of the premises for the time he was in possession."70 Rescission was
169. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1082; Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
at 433, 462 P.2d at 474; Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. at 141, 265 A.2d at 532.
170. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1082; Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
at 436, 462 P.2d at 475-76; Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii at 475-76, 462 P.2d at 483-84;
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. at 145-46, 265 A.2d at 534-35. Contra, Hutcherson v. Lebtin, 313
F. Supp. 1324 (NJ). Cal. 1970).
171. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1082; Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
at 434-36, 462 P.2d at 475; accord, Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 323 N.Y.S.2d
323 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
172. Damages, of course, were always available if the landlord breached his express
covenant to repair. Absent such a covenant, however, the tenant bad no cause of action.
See notes 1-16 supra and accompanying text.
173. "Rescission, as an alternative to a damage action for breach of warranty, terminates
the contract and allows the aggrieved party to recover what he has given or its value." 38
Fordham L. Rev. 818, 823 n.56 (1970), citing 12 S. Williston, §§ 1454, 1454A, 1455, 1462;
see text accompanying notes 178-80 infra.
174. Uniform Commerdal Code, § 2-714(2); 3 S. Williston, Sales § 613 (rev. ed. 1948).
In addition, incidental and consequential damages may be recovered. Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-715; 3 S. Williston, Sales § 614 (rev. ed. 1948).
175. 428 F.2d at 1082-83. Contra, In re Estate of Smith, 123 Misc. 69, 204 N.Y.S. 475
(Sur. Ct. 1924) ; 3 G. Thompson § 1065, at 254.
176. 428 F.2d at 1082-83.
177. 65 Misc. 2d at 24, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22.
178. 12 S. Williston § 1455. Williston specifically provides that rescission is permitted for
breach of warranty. Id. § 1462. See Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-711(1).
179. See William J. Davis, Inc. v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970); 3 G.
Thompson § 1030, at 90-91, § 1132, at 499-500, § 1137, at 528-29.
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permitted in Lemle, allowing the tenant to recover rents and deposits he had
paid in advance.'8 °
An additional remedy, and one not based upon contract principles, provided
the basis for recovery in Marini:'8 1 reimbursement of the tenant by the land-
lord for the cost of repairs made to put the premises in habitable conditions.1'a
This self-help approach is logically concomitant with the implied warranty of
habitability, in view of the acute housing shortage which exists in most urban
areas across the country today. 83 Practically speaking, it is the most effective
remedy available to the aggrieved urban tenant. The housing shortage makes
rescission as impractical for the urban tenant as abandonment under the theory
of constructive eviction.'8 Furthermore, damages and abatement do not solve
the basic problem, for when the landlord elects to accept reduced rent rather
than make the necessary repairs, the tenant is left in substandard and unhealthy
housing. Aside from the urban ghetto tenant, however, these contract remedies do
provide flexible alternatives for enforcing a tenant's rights against his breaching
landlord.
The self-help remedy was also permitted in Garcia.185 Although based upon a
tort-prevention principle rather than on an implied warranty of habitability, it
provided effective relief within the limits of traditional law. The Jackson18"
court also applied this remedy, and its holding is of potentially broader applica-
tion than Garcia since it distinguished the cases which were felt to control in
Garcia, limiting them strictly to their own facts. 8 7
V. CONCLUSION
The inadequacy of traditional landlord-tenant law in dealing with the modern
leasing situation is well documented. 18 The implied warranty of habitability,
if adopted by the courts, can displace many of these shortcomings. Legal scholar-
ship has supported this doctrine, 8 9 as have a few previous cases.100 The cases
discussed in this comment have adopted it and held it to be consonant with
sound policy. It is to be hoped that these cases have opened the way for ac-
ceptance of the implied warranty of habitability on a wide scale and that the
present trend evidences a willingness on the part of our courts to make the com-
mon law of landlord-tenant responsive to the realities of modern life.
180. 51 Hawaii at 428, 462 P.2d at 472.
181. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
182. Compare 3 G. Thompson § 1140, at 532, and 3A id. § 123, at 142, and § 1302, at
470, with Marini v. Ireland 56 N.J. at 145, 265 A.2d at 534.
183. See N.Y. Times, June 5, 1969 at 1, col. 5.
184. See text accompanying notes 24-36 supra.
185. 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Civ. Ct. 1970); see notes 130-38 supra and
accompanying text.
186. 318 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
187. Id. at 8-9.
188. Quinn & Phillips 321-42.
189. E.g., Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1279 (1960); Quinn
& Philips; Schoshinski, supra note 114; Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need
for Change, 44 Denver L.J. 387 (1967). See also Note, 1968 Wash. U.L.Q. 461.
190. E.g., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 172 (1969);
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
